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Gradualism 
The recession appears finally to have arrived, 
considering the fact that the number 
of unemployed workers and the amount 
of unused manufacturing capacity have now 
reached the highest levels of the past two 
to three years. As further evidence, the index 
of leading business-cycle indicators dropped 
sharply in March, climaxing a year-long 
downtrend. 
Will a recession cure the longstanding 
problem of inflation? If  so, how long and how 
deep a recession will be needed to dothe job? 
Or can the problem be solved through the 
gradual application of fiscal and monetary 
discipline, with emphasis on a slow but 
steady reduction in money-supply growth? 
Gradualism has long been advocated 
by many economists, such as the members 
of the Shadow Open Market Committee 
(SOMC), a group of monetarist-minded 
private economists who have been monitor-
ing the Federal Reserve's performance since 
1973. According to their view, a reduction 
in the money-growth rate of one percentage 
point a year could cut the inflation rate 
to 3 percent by 1985. Moreover, they argue 
that that result could be achieved with only 
a mild recession, which would cure itself 
as the market became convinced that the 
policy of  decelerated growth would continue. 
Other economists disagree, arguing that 
prices are less responsive to changes in 
economic conditions and policy actions than 
the SOMC suggests. Harvard economist Otto 
Eckstein, for example, claims that the infla-
tion rate cou  Id be reduced to 6 percent 
by 1985, but only after a prolonged period 
of recession involving a 1  O-percent average 
unemployment rate. 
Natural rate 
To put these different viewpoints into per-
spective, we should analyze the concept 
of the "natural rate of unemployment" -the 
full-employment rate which, if maintained, 
would be consistent with a stable inflation 
rate. The inflation rate will rise as long as the 
unemployment rate remains below the 
natural rate-even if the jobless rate is rising 
at the same time. On the other hand, the 
inflation rate will fall as long as the 
unemployment rate remains above the 
natural rate. The natural rate probably has 
increased over the past several decades, 
under the impact of demographic and insti-
tutional changes. According to most: 
estimates, the rate ranged between 4.0 and 
4.7 percent in the mid-1950's, but rose to 
between 5.0 and 6.0 percent in the 
mid-1970's, and even further to about 
6.5 percent in the late 1970's. 
An alternative measure is the "natural rate 
of capacity utilization," since the link 
between inflation and labor-force utilization 
can be translated into a I  ink between inflation 
and manufaCturing-capacity utilization. This 
link is understandable, because the natural 
rate of unemployment implies a stable 
equilibrium rate of growth in final output, 
which in turn implies an equilibrium rate 
of capacity utilization. But this rate, unlike 
the natural. rate of unemployment, has 
remained relatively stable in recent decades. 
Since the early 1950's, the inflation rate 
generally declined when capacity utilization 
rates fell below 82 percent of capacity, and 
increased when capacity utilization rose 
above that figure. 
The relationship between inflation and 
capacity uti  I  ization may be portrayed graph-
ically, with a counterclockwise movement 
evident in the line linking the annual points 
of intersection (see chart). In the mid-1950's, 
for example, inflation increased when utiliza-
tion rates rose above their equilibrium natural 
rate-and continued rising as long as utiliza-
tion rates remained high, even in the 1956-57 
period of decelerating output growth. How-
ever, the inflation rate decelerated during the steep 1958 recession, reflecting a decline 
in capacity utilization, so that the long expan-
sion of  the 1960's began with a relatively low 
inflation rate.  In contrast, the expansion 
a decade later began with a high inflation 
rate, reflecting the strains on industrial capac-
ity during the 1960's as well as the mildness 
of the ensuing recession. 
The same type of counterclockwise 
movement can be seen in the expansion 
of the late 1970's. In  1978-79, for example, 
the business expansion pushed the economy 
above stable-inflation utilization rates, with 
the unemployment rate averaging less than 
6 percent and the capacity-uti I  ization rate 
reaching 85  percent. Consequently, the 
imbedded rate of inflation accelerated, quite 
apart from the shocks administered by oil and 
farm price increases. 
How much relief? 
Given this background, how much inflation 
relief can we expect in the weaker business 
environment of the early 1980's? The his-
torical record would suggest support for the 
Eckstein thesis, since the inflation rate 
appears to decline slowly in response to 
changes in capacity utilization or unernploy-
ment. For instance, inflation on average 
declines one percentage point for each year 
that unemployment remains three per-
centage points above its natural rate, or for 
each year that capacity utilization remains 
eight percentage points below its natural rate 
of 82  percent. Thus the consumer price 
index, on an annual-average basis, could 
decline from about 11 v:!  percent in 1979 to 
about 6 percent in 1985 -but  only if we 
experience 1  O-percent unemployment over 
the intervening period. 
What grounds are there for such a pessimistic 
conclusion? According to the standard line of 
reasoning, a business downturn today leads 
to relatively small wage reductions in future 
labor contracts, since both labor and 
management expect government to stimulate 
economic activity whenever there are signs 
of rising unemployment and falling industrial 
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activity. People come to expect strong 
countercyclical government actions -and 
expect everyone else to anticipate the 
same--so that there is little incentive for 
labor to accept lower wages or for firms to 
lower prices. Under such  circumstances, a 
prolonged recession seems required to 
generate any rei ieffrom inflation. 
Other observers, such as the members of the 
Shadow Open Market Committee, argue that 
this resu It is not foreordained. The pessimistic 
conclusion depends on the public's belief 
that government policies will be the same in 
the future as in the past. Butthe results would 
be different if  government policies 
change-and if the public decides that the 
new policies will remClin  in effect. 
Policy ...  and outside shocks 
In the present context, the reaction to the 
strong policies adopted in the past six months 
should help determine the inflation outlook 
for the period ahead. If labor, management 
and consumers believe in policymakers' 
determination to overcome inflation, they 
will adjust their behavior patterns 
accordingly, so that we could experience 
greater price and wdge flexibility than in the 
past. The SOMC's inflation forecast, though 
contrary to recent historical experience, thus 
has good prospects of success. 
Outside shocks will continue to affect the 
price outlook. Import fees on crude oil and 
gasoline could mean a rise of 
0.75 percentage points in the inflation rate, 
and higher OPEC price quotations could 
boost the index even more. Still, a recession 
and sluggish recovery should mean less 
pressure on labor and capital markets and 
thus reduced price pressure from that source. 
But if we are to make substantial progress in 
the fight against inflation, policymakers will 
have to adhere to the present gradualist 
policy, and the public will have to perceive 
this policy as continuing. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELfTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
Large Commercial Banlcs 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  +  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  +  )/Net borrowed( - ) 
.  * Excludes trading account securities. 





























+  117 
- 13 
- 37 





+  674 
+  539 
+  285 
Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
+  13,397  +  10.7 
+  14,710  +  14.4 
+  3,230  +  10.6 
+  9,117  +  24.7 
+  2,829  +  13.1 
- 398  - 28.4 
- 1,413  - 17.8 
+  100  +  0.7 
+  527  +  1.2 
+  686  +  2.2 
- 3,551  - 11.9 
+  14,051  +  28.2 
+  14,582  +  36.0 
+  5,617  +  32.7 
Weekended  Comparable 
4/16/80  year-ago periOd 
35  66 
31  122 
4  55 
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